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Abstract 
Non-union direct voice has replaced union representative voice as the primary avenue for employee 
voice in the British private sector. This paper provides a framework for examining the relationship 
between employee voice and workplace outcomes that explains this development.  As exit-voice 
theory predicts, voice is associated with lower voluntary turnover, especially in the case of union 
voice.  Union voice is also associated with greater workplace conflict and poorer productivity. Non-
union voice is associated with better workplace financial performance than other voice regimes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last quarter century, there has been a dramatic shift in the forms of employee voice 
used in British private sector workplaces, with non-union voice growing at the expense of 
union voice. During this period there was virtually no statute constraining employers’ choice 
of voice. For instance, there was no national statutory works council system in place
1 and, 
unlike the USA
2, British employers were free to combine union voice with various forms of 
non-union voice, in what has been termed ‘dual channel voice’ (Millward et al., 2000). In this 
paper, we look at the choices made by private sector employers, rather than those in the 
public sector where public policy considerations may have been influential, and examine the 
effects on workplaces.  
The point of departure is the identification of the full set of voice options that exist 
within workplaces, not just union voice. Particular attention is paid to direct voice and 
representative voice and their association with workplace outcomes. Theory predicts that 
representative voice, particularly union voice, will be associated with lower quits and 
potentially with greater industrial action. However, non-union voice, particularly direct voice, 
may elicit greater labor productivity and better financial performance. The paper identifies 
independent associations between workplace voice regimes and workplace outcomes 
controlling for other covariates, thus testing whether the descriptive relations obtained for 
voice can be identified in a multivariate context.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 documents change in voice regimes 
in private sector workplaces over the period 1980-2004. It also identifies their association 
with workplace performance outcomes that, either directly or indirectly, enter into the cost-
                                                 
1 In April 2005 the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004 came into effect, introducing 
into UK law the right for employees to require their employers to negotiate about information and consultation 
arrangements. Employees can now require their employer to set up arrangements in which employers must 
consult on an ongoing basis. From April 2007, undertakings with at least 100 employees in the UK could be 
asked to put in place information and consultation arrangements.    2
benefit decision of the firm. Our data are the British Workplace Employment Relations 
Surveys (WERS) for 1980, 1984, 1990, 1998 and 2004
3. Section 3 presents the theory linking 
forms of voice and workplace outcomes. Section 4 describes our empirical specifications and 
how they relate to our hypotheses. Section 5 presents our results and Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Patterns of Voice Provision 
We define voice as any formal mechanism for two-way communication between 
management and workers. We distinguish voice regimes and voice types. A voice regime 
refers to the mix between union and non-union voice; regimes can take on union and non-
union forms and combinations thereof. Voice can also be decomposed into representative and 
direct voice types. Union voice is always a representative type. Non-union voice can take on 
both representative (such as independent works councils or joint consultative committees) 
and direct forms (such as team briefings with no intermediary management). Regimes and 
types may mix at establishment level; for example, dual channel voice mixes union and non-
union forms and may mix direct and representative types. We also identify no voice 
workplaces in which two-way communication mechanisms are absent. We turn to a 
description of the coverage of these categories. 
 
2.1 Voice  
The first two rows of Table 1 display the evolution of voice and no-voice workplaces in 
Britain for the private sector. While the proportion of workplaces with voice increased from 
about 76 percent in 1984 to 82 percent in 2004, there was little change in the interim period. 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 Le Roy(2006) documents how the Wagner Act has been interpreted as not allowing any other form of 
representation at the workplace other than union forms.  
3 Data for 1980 are confined to representative voice so they only appear in Table 2. The remainder of the paper 
uses data for 1984-2004.   3
The no-voice rate between 1984 and 1998 remained constant at about 25 percent; it fell to 18 
percent in 2004.  
 
2.2 Voice Regimes 
Figure 1 and the last four rows (rows 3 to 6) of Table 1 demonstrate the growing share of 
non-union only voice over the period 1984 to 2004. The most common form of voice at the 
start of period was dual channel at 30 percent. By the end of the period, non-union only voice 
constituted 56 percent of all private sector workplace voice regimes in Britain. This stands in 
sharp contrast with the declines in union only voice (18 percent to 4 percent between 1984 
and 2004) and dual channel voice (30 percent to 19 percent over the same period).  
While the scale of the decline in private sector union voice is by now well-
documented (in the form of falling union density and representation figures), the scope of the 
decline is often overlooked. By scope we mean the multiple dimensions in which union 
decline has been manifest beyond just membership decreases. In Figure 2 we see that 
whereas almost 60 percent of private sector workplaces had at least some union members at 
the start of the period, union presence dropped dramatically in the mid- to late-1980s. It has 
continued to fall reaching 37 percent in 2004. On-site union lay representation declined 
continuously, falling from 38 percent in 1980 to 13 percent in 2004 (Table 2 last row), 
suggesting a loss of unions’ ability to represent workers effectively even where unions 
continue to be recognised by the employer (Willman and Bryson, 2009). Finally, we see a fall 
in union recognition from 50 to 22 percent in 24 years.   4
2.3 Voice Types 
The incidence of voice types has also changed. While many authors have estimated the 
decline in the unionisation rate (Machin and Wood, 2005), few have considered the changing 
nature of non-union voice, in particular the growth of direct forms of voice. 
From Figure 3 and Table 2, we see that the decline in representative voice was more 
general, extending to its non-union forms. For instance, the percentage of workplaces with a 
functioning joint consultative committee (JCC) meeting once a month fell from 26 percent to 
15 percent by the end of the period. Though there was a small increase in non-union 
representatives at the workplace, the decline in JCC’s suggests that representative voice -- in 
both its union and non-union forms -- suffered a substantial decline in the private sector from 
1984 to 2004. 
By contrast, direct voice types have been either constant or increasing in coverage 
since 1984. The incidence of team briefings has more than doubled (31 percent at the start of 
the period rising to 70 by the end of the period). Regular meetings with senior management 
became more prevalent over the period 1984-1990 and have stabilised since.
4 On the whole, 
however, the decline in JCC’s has been gradual in the private sector whereas the incidence of 
direct voice rose dramatically.  
 
2.4 Summary 
In summary, voice coverage is as extensive in 2004 as 1984, but both voice regimes and 
voice types have changed substantially over the same period. These changes and their 
relations to workplace outcomes are the focus of this paper. 
Theories of union decline in Britain have often focused on employer opposition, 
macro-economic environment (high-unemployment in the 1980s to early 1990s period and   5
low inflation) and politics (an unfavourable legislative and social climate over the period 
prior to New Labour’s election in 1997). These theories are better at explaining decline in this 
period than the subsequent failure of revitalisation (Kelly, 1998; Metcalf, 2005).  
However, we argue above that unionisation changes may be part of a broader pattern 
of change in voice mechanisms. Section Two suggests that direct voice may be replacing 
representative voice in the private sector, whether that representative voice is union or not. 
Examining why direct forms of voice have replaced representative forms could hold the key 
to understanding union decline.  
 
3. Employee Voice and Workplace Outcomes: A Conceptual Framework 
By 2004, the primary suppliers of workplace voice in Britain were employers. In a voluntarist 
environment such as Britain, this shift suggests first, that voice provides benefits to 
employers and, second, that the returns to different voice regimes and types for employers 
were changing. If some voice regimes and types are associated with “better” outcomes such 
as higher labor productivity, then workplaces may, over time, substitute “successful” voice 
for “unsuccessful” voice. We adopt a simple cost-benefit approach in which the adoption of 
any voice regime or type is based on positive net benefits, and the choice of a particular voice 
regime or type is based on comparative performance
5. Benefits can relate to outcomes at the 
workplace, such as employee turnover or labor productivity that might be linked to the 
presence (or absence) of voice. 
                                                                                                                                                        
4 The time-series on problem-solving groups is problematic because questions are not consistent over the years. 
Efforts to construct a more consistent series for the period 1998-2004 suggest modest growth in their use over 
the period (Kersley et al., 2006: 93-94). 
5 A similar model was formally presented in Willman et al (2007). In other work, the possibility of evolutionary 
and path dependent processes, in which net-benefits are not necessarily the only determinant of voice 
adoption—are also considered (Bryson et al., 2007).   6
The precedent for this approach is Freeman and Medoff (1984) who empirically tested 
theoretical propositions about the relations between union voice and five workplace 
outcomes: 
  Profitability; 
  Labor productivity; 
  Labor turnover; 
  Industrial action  
  The climate of industrial relations. 
They demonstrated that, during the 1970s and early 1980s in the USA, workplaces 
with unions tended to have lower quit rates, higher productivity, and more labor unrest than 
non-unionised firms. A recent review of union effects reaffirmed their findings (Bennett and 
Kaufman, 2007), although the links between unions and labor productivity remain contested 
(Black and Lynch, 2004).  
Interpreting union effects is complicated because, as Freeman and Medoff stress, 
unions have two faces: their ‘voice’ and ‘monopoly’ faces. Whilst these two faces are not 
easy to disentangle conceptually or practically, we are primarily concerned in this paper with 
the effects of any voice relative to no voice, and with union voice relative to other voice 
regimes. There is very little empirical or theoretical research on the impacts of different voice 
regimes (i.e., union vs. non-union) on workplace-level outcomes, even less on voice types 
(i.e., direct vs. representative). The empirical work that has been undertaken tends to focus on 
outcomes for workers, and indicates that there are substantial benefits accruing to workers 
from non-union voice (Bryson, 2004). 
Since we view voice as an investment in workers by firms, we should be able to see 
returns to that investment relative to no voice, at least among ‘like’ workplaces that are 
observationally equivalent. Second, following Hirschman (1970), we anticipate that union   7
voice is associated with lower quits than other voice types because, as a collective 
organization which is independent of management and encourages investment in public 
goods, it has a higher capacity to resolve worker grievances than employer-generated voice.
6 
Third, by the same token, we anticipate that union voice is associated with more industrial 
action than other forms of voice, partly because reducing voluntary quits increases the stock 
of dissatisfied workers, and partly because unions use dissatisfaction in the bargaining 
process in what Freeman and Medoff (1984: 142) term “voice-induced complaining”. 
 
4. Interpretations of Voice and Workplace Outcomes  
In this section, we specify the expected direction of the voice and outcome variable relations 
and describe the form of the exit-voice model suitable for empirical testing. 
 
4.1 Worker Exit and Voice Regimes 
 
The exit-voice hypothesis is based on the idea that displeasure in the quality of a transaction 
or market relationship can be resolved by either the market mechanism (i.e., exiting, 
switching to an alternative supplier) or the political avenue of communicating (i.e., voicing) 
one’s displeasure over diminished quality. The exercise of voice is likely to lead to less 
switching just as a system of voice is more likely to emerge when switching (exiting) is 
costly. The presence of voice in both instances lowers the likelihood of exit. 
The extent of voluntary labor turnover (i.e., quits) in a given workplace is therefore 
determined, in part, by the presence of a voice regime at the workplace and a set of controls 
that may also influence levels of workforce turnover independently of voice. With a standard 
equation (in which turnover functions as our workplace outcome variable) the voluntary 
turnover rate (LT) is: 
                                                 
6 According to Freeman and Medoff (1984: 8–9): “Without a collective organization, the incentive for the 
individual to take into account the effects of his or her actions on others, or to express his or her preferences, or 
invest time and money in changing conditions, is likely to be too small to spur action.”   8
 
[1]   LTit  =  a it +  b1V it + b2X it + e. 
 
Here a is the baseline turnover rate for workplace i at time t, V is the voice variable that in all 
specifications is categorical and has as the omitted reference category ‘no-voice’ and can be 
run in two specifications in which the voice categories are either the three voice regimes 
(union, non-union and dual) or voice types (direct, representative, direct and representative), 
X is the vector of control variables that includes observable workplace characteristics such as 
industry, region, foreign ownership, age of establishment, single establishment status, 
workforce composition (percentage of females, non-manuals and part-timers), and workplace 
size. 
Focusing on V as our voice variable we can deduce some expected signs of the co-
efficient(s) with respect to quit rates. All voice categories are expected to have negative 
coefficients, b1<0 with respect to our excluded reference category (no voice) as a workplace 
with voice is expected to display lower exit than a workplace without. Across V categories, 
however, we would expect the strength of this association to vary systematically by the 
‘strength’ of voice.  
Voice that contains a recognised union is more difficult for a firm to jettison (short of 
workplace closure). In addition, the collective and independent nature of union voice is 
required in the provision of public goods to union members. As such, union forms of voice 
(both union only and dual forms) will likely display the lowest turnover rates whereas the 
forms of voice with no union presence are less likely to be as embedded and provide as many 
public goods, and hence less likely to reduce turnover (at least relative to union voice).
7 The 
exit-voice hypothesis therefore implies that i) the presence of voice is likely to lead to less   9
exit and that ii) stronger forms of voice (i.e. those more embedded within a workplace) will 
be associated with relatively lower voluntary exit. As dual voice contains both union and 
non-union voice side-by-side, it seems the least likely form of voice to be jettisoned by a firm 
and hence the most likely to encourage problem solving within the workplace rather than 
through exit. Our expected ranking of voice coefficients is therefore: 
 
[2]   LT it =b1 [(Dual Voice<Union Voice < Non-Union Voice) it <(No Voice) it]. 
 
We also expect this relation to be fairly robust over time unless laws governing employment 
separation are somehow made more or/less restrictive. This may not be the case with respect 
to other workplace outcomes discussed below. 
 
4.2 Other Workplace Outcome Hypotheses 
Industrial Climate and Industrial Action. Just as the exit-voice hypothesis predicts a 
positive association between lower labor turnover and more embedded forms of voice, so it 
implies a positive association with industrial action and poor perceptions of workplace 
climate. As Freeman and Medoff noted, it is precisely because unions solve problems inside 
the workplace -- grievances are mitigated inside the workplace rather than through ‘natural 
turnover’ -- that they are associated with more conflict ridden workplaces.  
This is to be expected since the lack of voice encourages exit, and the exit option 
reduces observed conflict inside the workplace. Unlike exit-voice, our climate and conflict 
measures will be more directly affected by legislation (e.g., laws preventing work stoppage in 
certain industries would lower measures of conflict such as strikes despite voice presence) 
and other external changes to the labor market (e.g., rising prices that could fuel demands for 
                                                                                                                                                        
7 These observations are not surprising given the nature of union membership and its continued association with 
a wage premium (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2007), structured promotional opportunities, greater on the job 
training and seniority rules that encourage longer tenure.   10
higher wages). Hence we would not expect these outcomes to be as stable as labor turnover in 
their coefficient estimates year-to-year. To allow for this we estimate both climate (CL) and 
industrial action (IA) separately as in equation (1): 
 




[4]   IAit  =  a it +  b1V it + b2X it + e. 
 
This formulation in eq. [4] for industrial action would have the opposite sign expectation(s) 
to our exit measure.  
The effects of voice versus no voice workplaces in terms of climate (CL) may not be 
so clear. On the one hand no voice may well engender worse feelings than any voice, but at 
the same time it could increase exit even more so as to offset any declines in workplace 
climate. Thus we expect our voice regime coefficients with respect to industrial action to be: 
 
[5] IA it =b1 [(Union Voice >Dual Voice> Non-Union Voice it >=) > (No Voice) it], 
 
For climate we see the patterns as similar but are not as ready to ascribe such a strong 
prediction. Equation [5] provides a complementary test of the exit-voice model.  
 
Labor productivity. Voice mitigates exit and increases the incentive to invest in a workforce 
since its tenure is more easily prolonged. Traditional models of on-the-job training (OJT) 
assume that underinvestment in training comes from moral hazard problems for both   11
employer and employee. On the employer side, the fear is that after a period of training, the 
worker’s value relative to the external market rises and results in (voluntary) exit from the 
firm. From the worker’s perspective, the investment in OJT is usually accompanied by an 
initial period of underpayment with respect to productivity (as the employer and employee 
share the cost of training in the form of lower wages) and hence the danger is that the worker 
never gets to recoup his or her investment in OJT since the employer reneges on the worker 
by sacking her once productivity falls below the wage-premium needed to recoup 
underpayments in the earlier period. 
Employee voice may prevent this dual moral hazard problem and reduce separation 
(either by the worker or the firm). It should therefore raise productivity for the firm’s 
workforce. We therefore have a clear prediction that voice should foster greater labor 
productivity than no voice. However, across voice regimes, differences may arise. Since the 
stronger or more embedded forms of voice, such as union representative voice, often impose 
restrictions on what management can or cannot do, there is likely some benefit to a firm that 
can establish its own brand of voice (typically direct) with or without union influence.  
The possible value of direct voice over union voice when it comes to productivity is 
summarised by theorists of ‘high involvement’ and ‘high performance’ HRM, who have 
traditionally argued that direct forms of employee communication are superior to traditional 
collective bargaining, so by extension it is more likely to boost productivity (Lawler, 1986; 
Peters, 1988; Pfeffer, 1994; Storey, 1992). Their reasoning is that voice through 
representatives can be inefficient because representatives act as a barrier between 
management and workforce. Further, the workforce is likely to have diverse wishes, needs 
and ideas which may not be fully represented through collective channels, where the concerns 
of the median worker are most likely to be represented. Direct voice allows management to   12
respond better to these diverse concerns, thereby eliciting more cooperation and commitment 
from employees. 
To understand this interpretation we can refer once again to our simple version of 
equation (1) above where labor productivity (LP) replaces turnover and: 
 
[6]   LPit  =  a it +  b1V it + b2X it + e 
 
is expected to yield a positive co-efficient b1 >0 for all voice types relative to no-voice. 
When we look at all the categories of voice, however, the order of voice coefficients 
would be expected to follow: 
 
[7]   LP it =b1 [(Non-Union Voice > Dual Voice >Union Voice >) it >(No Voice) it], 
 
where the forms of voice that reduce exit but also allow for more managerial experimentation 
and discretion may raise labor productivity the most.  
 
Financial performance. This is perhaps the most ambiguous of workplace outcomes in 
relation to voice for two reasons. First, voice entails an upfront investment and on-going 
governance cost, which only firms with financial ability will be able to pay, implying that the 
relation between financial performance and voice could be two-way (i.e. financially secure 
firms invest in voice, or vice versa) (Metcalf, 2003). Second, regardless of the specific causal 
linkages, in equilibrium, we would expect that workplaces should have optimally sorted 
themselves such that the returns to whatever particular voice regime chosen would yield the 
same net benefits. This means that in equilibrium, we should observe very little variation in 
financial performance across workplaces with respect to the presence or absence of voice.   13
This is because workplaces where voice is not likely to emerge exist either because the nature 
of work is routinized or a host of other observed (and unobserved) factors do not warrant its 
formation. If these workplaces therefore choose the no-voice outcome, they are in an ‘no-
voice equilibrium’ where the lack of investment in a voice regime balances out the lower 
productivity and higher turnover of labor. Similarly, if there are firms that require voice 
because the size of establishment is such that it generates a need for more complicated 
governance structures, then we would observe the investments in voice provision (bargaining 
costs, the managerial and employee time involved in hearing from workers and forming 
committees etc.) to be compensated for by lower turnover and greater effort from workers.  
On the other hand, to the extent that voice may not be an ‘unconstrained choice’ and 
is instead a technique (akin to a technical innovation) that requires skill and administration to 
master or is imposed (in the case of a unionisation drive opposed by management) on a firm 
or a workforce, we will see that the ‘true benefits’ (or the true costs) of voice emerge in the 
form of better (worse) financial performance. To understand this interpretation we run a final 
estimation of financial performance (FP) as (1) above: 
 
[8]   FPit  =  a it +  b1V it + b2X it + e, 
 
where we expect our test of voice equilibrium to be either zero with the equality of all voice 
coefficients, including no-voice (i.e., if the system of employee voice-choice in Britain over 
the period 1984-2004 was in equilibrium)  
 
[9.1]   FP it =b1 [(Union Voice ═ Dual Voice═ Non-Union Voice) it ═ (No Voice) it], 
   14
or, if in disequilibrium, a positive or negative direction of effects in particular periods will 
emerge across different voice regimes. The only clue we have as to which form(s) of voice 
may provide the greatest net-returns has been the spectacular rise in non-union direct forms 
of voice over the past 20 years in Britain. So we expect the positive relations to follow the 
following rank order: 
 
[9.2]   FP it =b1 [(Non-Union Voice > Dual Voice>Union Voice >) it > (No Voice) it]. 
 
Just as exit-voice is a hypothesis that provides for an unambiguous (negative) time invariant 
interpretation for the effect of voice on exit, so the test of equilibrium or disequilibrium in 
voice provision should provide an interpretation of the effect of voice and voice regimes on 
financial performance.  
 
5. Estimated Voice and Workplace Outcome Equations 
We present empirical evidence on associations between voice and the five workplace 
outcomes described above. We then, in turn, comment on whether the results are consistent 
with what we know about features of the exit-voice hypothesis. The results are based on 
pooled and separate year regressions that control for single-digit industry, region, foreign 
ownership, age of establishment, single establishment, workforce composition (percentage of 
females, non-manuals and part-timers), and workplace size. Throughout, our voice regime 
and voice type categories are those of Table 1 and Table 2. 
The empirical analysis identifies independent associations between voice regimes and 
workplace outcomes. Multivariate analyses imply that we are comparing those associations 
across observationally equivalent workplaces. The outcome measures for workplaces are: 
quits, industrial action, industrial climate, financial performance, and labor productivity. We   15
test for the statistical significance of differences across our four voice regimes (no voice; 
union only voice; dual voice; and union only voice) in relation to outcome measures, as well 
as the joint significance of the voice coefficients. Our aim is to see what associations, if any, 
emerge between voice regimes and these outcomes. 
 
5.1 Data and Measures 
The models for each of the five outcomes take the same form as equation [1]. Our data are 
the Workplace Employment Relations Surveys (WERS) which, with sample weighting, are 
nationally representative surveys of British workplaces conducted in 1980, 1984, 1990, 1998 
and 2004.
8 Data are collected from managers responsible for employment relations at the 
workplace. There is a lower size threshold of 25 employees. We drop observations with 
missing data and confine all analyses to workplaces in the private sector. All observations are 
weighted by the inverse of the workplace’s probability of selection for the survey. Details 
about the data measures and collection can be found in Appendix 1. 
Table 3 presents descriptive information on the relationship between voice regimes 
and the five workplace outcomes. We comment on these results alongside the multivariate 
analyses presented below in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
5.2 Estimated Exit-Voice Relations 
WERS records quit rates since 1990, measured as the percent of employees who resigned or 
left in the previous year. Panel A of Table 3 shows that quit rates were lowest in workplaces 
with some union voice, a result that persists throughout the period.
 9 In 1990 the regime with 
the lowest quit rates was union-only voice. However, quit rates rose in these workplaces 
                                                 
8 For further information on WERS see Millward, et al. (2000); Kersley, et al. (2006) and 
http://www.wers2004.info/ 
9 We have removed outliers with quit rates greater than 110% but their inclusion does not change the results 
appreciably.   16
through to 2004, whereas they fell in dual channel workplaces such that, at the end of the 
period, quit rates were lowest in dual channel workplaces. Contrary to expectations, quit rates 
were higher in non-union only voice workplaces than they were in no voice workplaces, 
although their quit rates had converged by 2004. 
To establish whether voice regimes had an independent association with quit rates we 
ran regression analyses controlling for workplace characteristics. The results are in Panel A 
of Table 4. 
They confirm the descriptive results. In the pooled years regressions both union 
regimes had significantly lower quit rates than non-union only and no voice regimes. In the 
single year regressions only dual channel voice is significantly associated with lower quits 
than the no voice regime. Relative to non-union voice only, both union only and dual channel 
voice regimes were associated with lower quit rates in the pooled years’ regression analysis 
and for separate year regressions in 1990 and 1998, though in 2004 it is only true for dual 
channel versus non-union only voice. The general pattern, despite some year-to-year 
variation, is that union voice variables are negatively related to quit rates in the British private 
sector.  
In Panel A of Table 5, a similar pattern emerges with respect to representative versus 
direct forms of voice. Although no type consistently outperforms no voice, representative 
voice has consistently lower quit rates compared to direct voice; these differences are usually 
statistically significant in both the pooled and specific year regressions. It appears that more 
embedded voice is associated with fewer quits. 
 
5.3 Estimated Industrial Climate and Industrial Action 
In WERS, managers are asked “how would you rate the relationship between management 
and employees generally at this workplace?” Subjective ratings range from “very poor” to   17
“very good”. Descriptive analysis in Panel B of Table 3 reveals that the percentage of 
workplaces reporting ‘very good’ climate tends to be higher with non-union voice and is 
poorest in union-only workplaces (as expected under our corollary of the exit-voice 
hypothesis). Also, consistent with expectations, non-union only voice is associated with the 
best perceptions of climate although, as the last column of Table 3 indicates, climate in these 
workplaces has been deteriorating at a faster rate than in other workplaces. 
Table 4 Panel B presents coefficients from ordered probit regressions for climate 
where climate is collapsed into a three-way variable in which 1=poor/average 2=good and 
3=very good. In the pooled regression results, the presence of non-union only voice is 
associated with better climate than no voice and union-only voice. However, reflecting the 
descriptive results, the gap has closed over time; whereas non-union only voice was 
associated with significantly better climate than both union-only voice and dual channel voice 
in 1984, this was no longer the case by 2004. Indeed, the voice measures were no longer 
jointly significant by 2004. 
In Panel B of Table 5 we find that direct voice is associated with the best climate 
responses amongst managers. In pooled years, direct only voice is associated with better 
climate than representative-only voice and no voice, but there are no significant differences 
between direct voice only and regimes that combine representative and direct voice. Thus 
perceived climate is best when the voice regime includes direct voice. These relations do 
change over time however, as direct only voice is not the ‘best’ type from 1990 onwards. 
Indeed in 1998 the combination of representative and direct voice is associated with better 
climate than other voice. By 2004 there are no significant differences across any types.
10 
Managers were asked whether there has been any form of industrial action at the 
workplace in the last 12 months (excluding lock-outs) with types of action presented on a   18
show-card. Our descriptive results in Table 3 Panel C show that there has been an overall 
reduction in industrial action across all workplaces. Not surprisingly, union-based regimes 
are associated with a higher probability of industrial action than non-union voice only and no 
voice. This is confirmed statistically in Panel C of Table 4 regression analyses for the pooled 
years and in separate regressions for 1984-1990.
11 If one re-runs the regression analyses 
separately identifying constituents of the voice typology (in results not reported here), 
workplaces with unions recognised for pay bargaining continue to have a higher probability 
of industrial action than otherwise ‘like’ non-unionised workplaces in 2004. This reinforces 
the corollary to the exit-voice hypothesis, that by establishing voice, conflict is internalised 
through action rather than being externalised through higher turnover.  
 
5.4 Estimated Labor Productivity 
Since 1990, WERS has asked managers to rate labor productivity relative to the industry 
average. They respond on a scale running from “a lot below average” to “a lot above 
average.” For the regression analysis this is collapsed into a three-way variable identifying 
workplaces identifying themselves as “below average”, “average” and “above average”. 
Descriptive analyses in Table 3 Panel D indicate that labor productivity is highest in non-
union only voice workplaces and lowest in union-only regimes. The gap is most pronounced 
in 2004. 
In the pooled regressions for voice regimes in Table 4 Panel D none of the regimes 
outperform  no voice workplaces. However, union only voice is associated with lower 
productivity than non-union only voice (-0.27, t=2.29). Dual Channel voice is also associated 
with lower labor productivity than non-union only voice, though the differential effect is only 
                                                                                                                                                        
10 In results not reported here, when we split the voice regimes into their components and run the same 
regressions the only statistically significant effect is the positive effect of having regular meetings between 
senior managers and all sections of the workforce. 
11 It was not possible to run an analysis for 1998 due to the very low incidence of industrial action in that year.   19
on the margins of statistical significance (-0.18, t=1.93). Separate year models are less clear 
cut as no statistically significant differences across voice regimes exist and no obvious time 
trends emerge. 
The findings on type of voice are inconclusive, all coefficients being weak and non –
significant. 
 
5.5 Estimated Financial Performance  
Managers are asked to assess their workplace’s financial performance relative to the industry 
average in the same way as labor productivity. Panel E in Table 3 indicates a clear 
association between a workplace’s financial performance on this measure relative to the 
industry average and its voice regime. We see that non-union voice is associated with better 
financial performance than union-only voice in all years, often by a wide margin. The 
performance of dual channel regime workplaces improved markedly over the period. In the 
pooled regression estimates in Panel E of Table 4 we see that non-union only voice performs 
better than all other regimes. However, the coefficients for the other three regimes are 
virtually identical, suggesting some kind of separated equilibrium. The effects are very clear 
in the early 1980s, disappear in 1990s, but return once again in 2004. Interestingly, as one 
would predict if equilibrium processes were at work, over the entire period, differences 
between the other 3 voice regimes are not statistically significant. 
In Table 5, Panel E, distinguishing between direct and representative voice types, we 
find that those with direct voice only appear to perform better than others and that 
representative only voice performs particularly poorly. In pooled regressions for all years we 
find that direct only voice is positively associated with financial performance as compared to 
no-voice and union-only voice, but it is not significantly different from the combination of 
direct and representative voice. In the 1984 regression direct only voice ‘outperforms’ all   20
other regimes including the combination of direct and representative voice but, by 2004, the 
only significant difference is the significantly better performance of direct-only voice over 
‘no voice’. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
One of Freeman and Medoff’s key contributions was to examine empirically the relationship 
between voice and outcomes. However, they focused on union voice using US data. This 
meant that comparative analysis of the effects of different types and regimes of voice on 
outcomes could not be examined. The British case for the period under consideration allowed 
employers to choose voice types and regimes, and indeed to mix them. We are thus able to 
provide a more finely grained analysis of voice-outcome relationships. 
This is important, since over this period of time union voice collapsed but the overall 
provision of voice did not. Approximately 8 out of 10 private sector workplaces had voice 
throughout the period, but far more of this was direct and non-union at the end of the period. 
Direct non-union voice is ‘constructed’ by employers rather than the outcome of collective 
action by employees, so it is a significant question to ask why, when union voice declined, 
employers chose to take on the expense of voice construction rather than to dispense with 
voice altogether. 
Our data indicate that over the last quarter century non-union voice, particularly direct 
voice, is associated with better financial performance and labor productivity than union voice 
(though not necessarily than dual channel voice). As exit voice theory predicts, lower quits 
and higher industrial action are characteristics of union voice regimes. We do not assess 
causality in this paper, though this does offer a way forward for future research in this area, 
but it may be that the shift away from union voice can be explained in terms of the returns to   21
different voice types and regimes. The maintenance of voice in most workplaces may reflect 
the perceived superiority of voice over no-voice. 
These results also have several broader implications. First, the decline in unionisation 
and the positive relationship between non-union voice regimes and workplace outcomes 
provides a prima facie explanation for the growth in the latter. As union coverage collapses, 
employers have invested in beneficial voice, to the extent that voice coverage expands overall 
and employee voice is primarily an employer funded phenomenon. Second, and conversely, 
union presence is most robust where it is mixed with non-union voice in dual channel 
regimes. Employers add non-union to union voice, avoiding the need for union de-
recognition and preserving the existing benefits of union voice. 
These concluding observations presume employers are free to choose voice 
mechanisms. In the private sector in the UK in the period 1980-2004, this was almost 
certainly the case. That this may be an unusual situation limits the applicability of our 
findings. That this might provide an important setting in which to structure future labour 
policies and analyse the operation of employer choice enhances their interest. 
   22
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Figure 2: 





















Note: Lines (from top to bottom) refer to the presence of any  union members at the 
workplace any recognized union at the workplace, and any on-site lay representative.   26
Figure 3: 

























Note: Dark lines refer to non-union direct voice. Dotted lines represent non-union 
representative voice. JCC refers to Joint Consultative Committee.    27
Table 1: 





























2. Voice (all types)  76  75  76  82  +6 













3.  Union only   18  11  6  4  -14 
 
4. Union and non-union  30  27  18  19  -11 
 






































Notes: This voice typology is constructed using the voice items in Table 2 which are present 
in the data throughout the period 1984-2004. All values are column percentages. Panel B 
columns may not add up to total voice percentages in Row 2 due to rounding. 
Source: WERS survey various waves. 
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Table 2: 









1980 1984 1990 1998 2004 
 
Diff* 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [5]-[1] 
 






















2. On-site JCC that meets at least once a 

































4. Regular meetings between senior 


















































Panel B: Union Provided Voice 
 
 












































Notes: See Date Appendix 1 for a description of Table 2 row measures. †Excluding health 
and safety. *For values with no 1980 data latest time period is chosen for difference. 
Source: WERS survey various waves.   29
Table 3:  





1984 1990 1998 2004  Difference  Change 
[1] [2] [3] [4] No Voice*  [4]-[1] 
 
Panel A  
 
Outcome: Turnover (Percentage of Employee Quits) 
1. By No Voice  NA 13.9 17.6 18.64 --  4.7 
2. By Union Only Voice  NA  8.2 13.2 12.1 -6.5 3.9 
3. By Dual Voice  NA  12.9 12.7 10.6 -8.0 -2.3




Outcome: Industrial Climate (Percentage Reporting “Very Good” 
Climate) 
1. By No Voice  44.8  32.9  35.3  38.8  --  -6.0 
2. By Union Only Voice  30.8  35.6  31.4  33.5  -5.4  2.7 
3. By Dual Voice  36.7  24.8  41.0  33.0  -5.8  -3.7 




Outcome: Industrial Action (Percentage of Workplaces Reporting 
Any Industrial Action in Last 12 months) 
1. By No Voice  0.50  0.4  0.0  0.80  --  0.3 
2. By Union Only Voice  20.6  6.4  2.8  7.1  6.3  -13.5 
3. By Dual Voice  19.6  12.8  3.9  4.1  3.3  -15.5 




Outcome: Labor Productivity (Percentage of Workplaces Reporting 
Above Average Labor Productivity)
1. By No Voice  NA  48.5 44.1 51.5 --  3.0 
2. By Union Only Voice  NA  38.2  43.7  43.1  -8.4  4.9 
3. By Dual Voice  NA  46.5  51.2  43.3  -8.2  -3.2 




Outcome: Financial Performance (Percentage of Workplaces 
Reporting Above Average Financial Performance) 
1. By No Voice  41.0  55.8  56.3  45.8  --  4.8 
2. By Union Only Voice  42.6  53.1  56.4  41.3  -4.5  -1.3 
3. By Dual Voice  40.7  62.6  57.9  53.2  7.4  12.5 
4. By Non-Union Only Voice  60.8  54.2  63.7  63.6  17.8  2.8 
 
*Differences in voice categories with respect to No Voice are calculated with most recent 
end of period (2004) values.   30
Table 4:  







Pooled 1984  1990  1998  2004 
1 2 3 4 5 
Panel A   Dependent Variable: Turnover†
1. [No Voice]             
2. Union Only Voice  <0  -4.29**  NA  -3.76  -6.07  -5.29 
3. Dual Voice  <0  -4.67**  NA  -0.94  -8.15**  -7.27** 
4. Non-Union Only Voice  <0  0.58  NA  2.18  -1.61  0.30 
Panel B   Dependent Variable: Industrial Climate†† 
1. [No Voice]             
2.  Union  Only  Voice  <0  -0.09 -0.31 -0.05 -0.01 -0.08 
3. Dual Voice  <0  0.07  -0.10  -0.10  0.37*  0.15 
4. Non-Union Only Voice  >0  0.19*  0.24  0.22  0.23  0.15 
Panel C   Dependent Variable: Industrial Action††† 
1.[No  Voice]         
2. Union Only Voice  >0  1.21**  1.61**  1.07**  NA  0.65 
3. Dual Voice  >0  1.28**  1.62**  1.52**   NA  0.44 
4. Non-Union Only Voice  =0  0.45  -0.58  0.58  NA  0.25 
Panel D   Dependent Variable: Labor Productivity†††† 
1. [No Voice]             
2. Union Only Voice  <0  -0.15  NA  -0.28  -0.08  -0.07 
3. Dual Voice  >=0  -0.05  NA  -0.06  0.05  -0.06 
4. Non-Union Only Voice  >0  0.12  NA  0.04  0.05  0.24 
Panel E   Dependent Variable: Financial Performance††††† 
1. [No Voice]             
2. Union Only Voice  <0  0.00  0.08  0.05  -0.01  -0.14 
3. Dual Voice  >0  -0.00  -0.14  0.09  0.14  -0.01 
4. Non-Union Only Voice  >0  0.17*  0.50**  -0.13  0.15  0.32* 
 
Notes: Cells in columns 1-5 are coefficients and variables in [ ] are omitted reference 
category. All specifications (panels A to E), control for single-digit industry, region, 
foreign ownership, age of establishment, single establishment, workforce composition 
(percentage of females, non-manuals and part-timers), and workplace size. All 
regressions are survey-weighted. Full results are available from the authors on request. * 
indicates 5% and ** 1% significance.†Turnover (measured as quits) was estimated using 
Tobit regressions to account for the left-censoring of the data at zero. †† Industrial 
climate was estimated using ordered probit where 1=poor/average 2=good 3=very good. 
Although 1998 data are included in pooled estimates, the single year estimates for 1998 
are omitted due to the very low incidence of industrial action that year.††† Industrial 
action was estimated using probit for any industrial action in the previous 12 months. 
†††† Labor productivity was estimated using ordered probits for labor productivity 
relative to the industry average where 1=below average 2=average 3=above average. 
These data were not collected in 1984.††††† Financial performance was estimated using 
ordered probit for financial performance relative to the industry average where 1=below 
average 2=average 3=above average   31
Table 5 







Pooled 1984  1990  1998  2004 
1 2 3 4 5 
Panel A   Dependent Variable: Turnover 
1. [No Voice]             
2. Direct Only Voice  <0  0.29  NA  1.98  -2.14  0.30 
3. Direct & Representative Voice  <0  -2.74  NA  -0.16  -4.64  -5.62* 
4. Representative Only Voice  <0  -2.93  NA  -2.21  -5.33*  -2.60 
Panel B   Dependent Variable: Industrial Climate 
1. [No Voice]             
2. Direct Only Voice  >0  0.18*  0.34  0.21  0.18  0.14 
3. Direct & Representative Voice  >0  0.16  -0.03  -0.02  0.45**  0.23 
4. Representative Only Voice  <0  -0.05  -0.32*  0.04  0.06  -0.02 
Panel C  Dependent Variable: Industrial action
1. [No Voice]             
2. Direct Only Voice  =0  0.53  -0.51  0.72  NA  0.20 
3. Direct & Representative Voice  >0  1.15**  1.50**  1.32**  NA  0.50 
4. Representative Only Voice  >0  1.07**  1.49**  0.94*  NA  0.51 
Panel D   Dependent Variable: Labor Productivity 
1. [No Voice]             
2. Direct Only Voice  >0 0.12 NA -0.03 0.09  0.23
3. Direct & Representative Voice  >0  0.03  NA  0.06  0.08  0.00 
4. Representative Only Voice  =0  -0.10  NA  -0.22  -0.19  0.14 
Panel E   Dependent Variable: Financial Performance 
1. [No Voice]             
2. Direct Only Voice  >0  0.19*  0.58**  -0.13  0.18  0.31* 
3. Direct & Representative Voice  >0  0.07  -0.06  0.07  0.25  0.12 
4. Representative Only Voice  =0  -0.03  0.06  -0.02  -0.19  -0.06 
 
Notes: Cells in columns 1-5 are coefficients and variables in [ ] are omitted reference 
category. Full results are available from the authors on request. See footnote to Table 4 
for details of controls, dependent variables and notation.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Data Used for Voice Measures 
We focus on a voice typology that relies on the data items available for 1984-2004, that is 
from Table 2, items 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, but we supplement this with a measure 
incorporating items 3 and 6 for the shorter period of 1990-2004. Our typologies 
distinguish workplaces with union-voice only (items 7-9 plus item 2 if the JCC’s have 
union representation) from those with non-union voice only (item 2 if there are no unions 
involved, items 1 and 2 and, for the period since 1990, items 3 and 6). Our typology also 
identifies workplaces with a combination of union and non-union voice, which we term 
“dual channel” voice. The fourth category in our typology is “no-voice” workplaces 
which are defined by the absence of two-way forms of representative or direct 
communication between workers and management.  
 
Data for Tables and Figures 
Data in Figures 1–4 and Tables 1-2 are for all workplaces with 25 or more employees. 
“NA” means “not available”. Table 2 Rows 1-3 characterize the representative voice 
mechanisms provided by employers. Table 2 Rows 4-6 characterize the direct voice 
mechanisms provided by employers. Some items are not wholly comparable over time. 
Regular workforce meetings: the measure of regular meetings changed in 2004. For the 
first time the question asked how often meetings occurred, rather than whether they 
occurred ‘regularly’. Throughout the chapter we say regular meetings occurred in 2004 if 
they took place at least once a month. If we used ‘at least once a fortnight’ the incidence 
drops to 21% in 2004 whereas if we use ‘at least once every three months’ it rises to 
64%. In 2004 the question is: “Do you have meetings between senior managers and the 
whole workforce (either altogether or group by group)?” whereas the 1998 question 
refers to “regular meetings with the entire workforce present”. Millward et al.(2000: 118-
120) note concerns about comparability of the measure in earlier years too. They argue 
that the 1998 question is not comparable to 1984 and 1990 question. They therefore 
present a figure for 1998 based on a combination of cross-section and panel data 
producing an estimate of 48% in 1998 instead of the 37% presented above. Team 
briefings: In 2004 managers are asked: “Do you have meetings between line managers or 
supervisors and all the workers for whom they are responsible? INTERVIEWER: If 
asked, these are sometimes known as 'briefing groups' or 'team briefings'?” The 1998 
question is: “Do you have a system of briefings for any section or sections of the 
workforce here?” Millward et al. (2000: 118-120) argue that the 1998 question is not 
comparable to 1984 and 1990. They therefore present a figure based on a combination of 
cross-section and panel data of 65% in 1998 as opposed to 52% presented above. 
Whichever measure one adopts, briefings rose substantially over the period but whether 
the ‘spurt’ occurred between 1990 and 1998 or between 1998 and 2004 is a moot point. 
Problem solving groups: this time-series is very problematic. Kersley et al. (2006: 94) 
say the 1998 and 2004 measures are not comparable because a change in question 
wording in the 2004 Cross-Section Survey restricted it to groups of solely non-
managerial employees. They therefore present estimates combining the cross-section and 
panel data (the panel question didn't change). Footnote 11 of Kersley et al. (2006) 
Chapter 4 gives details of the method. Using the 2004 'restricted' definition the incidence   33
of problem-solving groups was 16% in 1998 and 21% in 2004 for the 10+ employee 
population. Using the less restrictive definition the figures are 28% and 36% respectively. 
The time-series presented above does not use panel data and thus clearly understates the 
incidence of problem-solving groups. The reliance on time-series data gives the 
impression that these groups have become less common between 1998 and 2004 whereas 
better data (combining cross-section and panel) suggests that they have grown a little. 
Non-union representatives: the question wording is ambiguous in 1998 so that 
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